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News Coverage about  
Direct-Democratic Campaigns in a 
Period of Structural Crisis
Linards Udris, Mark Eisenegger, and Jörg Schneider 
Abstract
This article examines whether money talks in political campaign  coverage. 
 Analyzing news coverage about twenty-nine recent direct-democratic  campaigns 
in Switzerland, it shows that votes involving expensive campaigns and populist 
proposals—and ideally both—correlate with high media attention. This favors 
especially Switzerland’s largest party with the most resources, the right-wing 
populist Swiss People’s Party (SVP). A case study of one vote on media  policy 
confirms these patterns and shows that news coverage is also shaped by the 
vested (self-)interests of media organizations. The results imply that news media, 
affected by the crisis in journalism, fail to cover a truly wide diversity of actors 
and topics.
Keywords: campaigns, media logic, content analysis, populist radical right, media 
ownership 
Switzerland is seen often times as a paradigmatic case with its long tradi-
tion of direct democracy, where citizens are regularly asked to cast their 
votes on policy issues on several levels (national, cantonal, and munici-
pal) several times a year. When casting their vote, citizens (need to) rely 
on publicly available information on these issues; among these sources, 
the news media have become the most important source of information 
about politics and society and the primary channel of communication 
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between political actors and citizens.1 Taking into account the crucial role 
of the news media, the question of media performance becomes highly 
relevant. Some scholars claim that in Switzerland’s “educated democracy,” 
direct-democratic campaigns are “routine and ritualized business” for the 
media, which leads to a substantial, differentiated, and balanced news cov-
erage that helps citizens to make informed decisions.2 Not all, however, 
share this rather positive view.
First, scholars point at the fact that direct-democratic campaigns, in 
comparison to election campaigns, are less predictable for the media, 
and “short-term campaign strategies and campaign tactics” become more 
important.3 In this sense, (some) political actors have better chances to 
“instrumentalize” the media (e.g., by adapting to the media logic) and 
increase their chances for successful campaigns at the expense of other 
actors. Recent examples support this view: one can think of successful 
campaign strategies by the right-wing populist Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 
with its initiatives, which successfully demanded a ban on minarets (2009), 
an expulsion of “criminal foreigners” (2010), and a curb on immigration 
(2014)—all of which generated very high media attention. Tellingly, the 
party managed to generate “free media,” that is, media attention, with its 
own “paid media,” that is, political advertising. In the clearest example, 
the party launched a highly provocative poster depicting an aggressive- 
looking woman wearing a Burka and rocket-like minarets mushrooming 
on the Swiss flag; it generated controversy, was prohibited to be displayed 
in some cities, and found its way into one of Switzerland’s largest political 
talk shows, when a whole program was devoted to the SVP campaign. 
Provocation worked.
Second, the positive view on media coverage about direct-democratic 
campaigns usually results from findings generated before the most recent 
period of structural crisis in journalism. This crisis can be observed on 
the structural level; it includes, among others, sinking advertising and 
subscription revenue and an erosion of the economic basis of those news 
1. Mazzoleni, “Mediatization,” 3052–55; Strömbäck. Survey evidence on media use shows that 
more than 80 percent of surveyed people in Switzerland use newspaper articles as an information 
source before the vote, and around three-quarters use TV news programs. Information booths 
(e.g., by political parties) on the street are used only by 10 percent. See Milic, Rousselot, and 
Vatter, 296–302.
2. See Kriesi, Political Communication; Marcinkowski and Donk; and Marquis, Schaub, and 
Gerber.
3. de Vreese, 107.
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outlets that still try to produce quality journalism. In contrast to that, 
those news outlets that focus on soft news are increasingly rewarded 
with increasing audience numbers and advertising revenue. Assuming 
that substantial, relevant journalism can be provided only in a media 
system with related facilitating structures (financial resources, human 
resources, time resources, etc.), one would expect sinking resources 
and growing commercial pressure on news outlets to have an impact 
on media performance. One result might be the media’s ongoing “push 
to popularize politics,”4 which is done to satisfy (alleged) media con-
sumer needs. In this sense, “media logic” on the basis of certain news 
factors further intensifies, which basically means “the selection, organi-
zation, and production of issues according to criteria of competiveness” 
and thus according to a “commercial logic”—with the goal being the 
 maximization of audience (readers, viewers, and listeners) in order to 
generate profit.5
With this increasing (commercial) “media logic,”6 the diversity of 
issues and actors as presented in the news media is expected to decrease. 
Two types of actors in particular stand better chances to build the media 
agenda with “their” issues and “their” messages at the expense of other 
actors and issues: powerful actors that have the (financial) resources to 
conduct highly visible campaigns specifically geared to the media logic, 
and populist actors in general, who with their issues and their provoc-
ative communication style serve the media logic—and even better still, 
populist actors with enough resources. In this sense, the diversity of 
actors and issues shrinks. In the case of direct-democratic campaigns, 
there are indications that this recent transformation of media struc-
tures indeed affects news coverage: Successful initiatives by the populist 
radical-right SVP triggered large media attention also because of cost- 
intensive and highly provocative campaign strategies, which resonate in 
a media system where news media operate more and more in a commer-
cialized media logic.7
Still, there is no systematic research yet as to how the current transfor-
mation of media structures affects news coverage about direct-democratic 
4. Umbricht and Esser.
5. Landerer, 243–44; Meyen, Thieroff, and Strenger, 277.
6. Mazzoleni, “Mediated Populism.”
7. Udris, Imhof, and Ettinger.
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campaigns and whether these populist initiatives are mere exceptions.8 
Against this background, our article aims to shed light on the current 
patterns of news coverage about direct-democratic campaigns. With data 
from an ongoing project, it captures news coverage about twenty-nine dif-
ferent votes (taking place on ten different voting days) between 2013 and 
2015. It analyzes which votes trigger media attention and the possible rea-
sons why certain votes are much more in the media spotlight than others. 
Focusing on the role of campaign actors, apart from more long-term struc-
tural factors such as the type of conflict, we analyze whether the intensity 
of a campaign in the form of political advertising expenditures can explain 
these differences. In short: Do political actors manage to have the media 
talk about “their” issue because they have more money? Is it mainly popu-
list actors and populist campaigns that have the upper hand compared to 
other actors?
While this overall analysis looks at the possible impact of political 
actors and their campaign strategies, our article includes a case study of 
one of these twenty-nine votes, which serves to examine more media- 
centered factors. To this end, we select a case in the field of media policy 
(a vote on the revision of broadcasting law). This selection was done 
because, first, this referendum was launched by an organization with 
close ties to the right-wing populist party SVP and mainly conducted as 
a populist campaign, and second because news organizations themselves, 
especially in this period of structural crisis, are affected by this revision. 
Relying on the literature, one could expect that news outlets fail “to 
report accurately on issues in which their corporate owners have a vested 
interest.”9 With this case study, we try to show to what extent economic 
and political interests by news organizations themselves have an impact 
on campaign news coverage about this media policy vote. Together with 
the overall analysis, we will be able draw conclusions as to what chances 
populist actors and their campaign strategies have in a media system in a 
period of structural crisis.
8. Most available studies cover an earlier period that is only partially affected by the current 
structural changes in the media system, for example, only up to the mid-2000s. Examples are 
Marcinkowski and Donk; or Marquis, Schaub, and Gerber. More recent studies are based on 
very small samples of votes. One example is Kriesi, Political Communication, who analyzed three 
votes.
9. Schejter and Obar, 590.
This content downloaded from 130.60.47.22 on Fri, 13 Jan 2017 07:25:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
72        JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY
News Media in a Period of Structural Crisis: Current 
Transformations of Media Structures
Switzerland’s media system, like media systems in many (Western) 
 European countries, is currently in a period of substantial transformation. 
First, addressing audience shifts, digitization fosters the growth of enter-
tainment media at the expense of information media. Traditional use of 
news outlets in the press, radio, and television sector has been rapidly 
sinking in the last years; Switzerland’s best and most widely used current 
affairs program (Echo der Zeit) on public radio, for instance, has lost around 
25 percent of its audience in the last five years.10 In the case of public radio, 
the growing use of the online platform of the public broadcaster (incl. pod-
casts, etc.) does not compensate for the losses of traditional use. Also, “leg-
acy” media such as daily subscription papers experience audience losses, 
while cost-free papers, which offer low-quality news, experience audience 
gains: 20 Minuten, launched in 1999, is now by far the largest newspaper in 
Switzerland, and its newspaper Internet site also attracts many more users 
than those of the “legacy” media. Generally, this trend is aggravated by 
the rise of social media: Generally, those newspaper Internet sites that are 
accessed relatively often via Facebook are those with audience gains, and 
in terms of media content, it is exactly the same news outlets that also 
display a high degree of “soft news” articles, which are much more likely 
to spread virally and be linked to Facebook, Twitter, and the like than are 
“hard news” articles.11 In sum, this new media use is dominated by a use of 
episodic, moralistic– emotional soft news, and the audience of high-quality 
journalism is shrinking. Thus, even more so than before, a type of jour-
nalism is rewarded with audience attention that offers comparatively low 
quality.
Second, with this ongoing digitization of the media system and the 
growing convergence online, which also means increasing competition, 
information media are hurting financially. Not only has revenue from 
advertising and subscription sunk, especially for daily papers, but online 
does not (yet) generate substantial income. One reason is the dominance 
of international “tech giants” such as Google and Facebook, which siphon 
off most of the advertising revenue that can be generated online. Another 
reason is that users are not willing enough to pay for news online, and 
10. fög.
11. Loc. cit.
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advertising revenue in the online sector that flows to Swiss news 
 organizations is still very small. In the Swiss case, there is more evidence 
supporting the findings by Merja Myllylahti, who does not see paywalls, 
for instance, as a viable business model,12 than the claims by Robert Picard, 
who sees enough opportunities for a mixed-financing model in the online 
sector for media organizations.13
These structural problems enhance the trends of media concentration, 
of news organizations merging their outlets and programs, of news orga-
nizations placing more and more emphasis on business units not directly 
connected to news (e.g., buying online ad-platforms). It also means that 
news outlets are more willing than before to accept money (and thus con-
trol) by political actors. In the last five to ten years, financial difficulties 
have opened new doors for powerful political actors, shifting a part of the 
Swiss media system toward “re-politicization.” In the Swiss case, this trend 
is mainly led by Switzerland’s largest party, the right-wing populist SVP, 
which happens to be the party with the largest campaign budgets. One can 
point at the case of the daily paper Basler Zeitung, which since 2014 has 
been officially cofinanced by Christoph Blocher, SVP vice president and 
former federal councilor (federal government). A second case is the weekly 
paper Weltwoche, which is owned by Roger Köppel, who entered politics 
in 2015 as a candidate for the SVP and was elected into national Parliament 
with most votes out of all candidates in Switzerland’s largest voting district, 
the canton of Zurich. A third case is the near success at Switzerland’s most 
prestigious newspaper NZZ when the editor-in-chief of the Basler Zeitung 
(and thus an editor supporting the SVP) almost became editor-in-chief of 
the NZZ in late 2014 after the current editor-in-chief had been fired.14 This 
appointment was called off only after massive protests by journalistic staff 
of the NZZ against the board of directors.
This structural transformation described earlier arguably has an impact 
on the actual content that is produced. Sinking resources and growing 
commercial pressure on news outlets could lead to a faster news produc-
tion cycle in which journalists have less time to invest in their work and 
put news into perspective.15 Data from large-scale content analyses show 
that this is indeed what happens: in most media types, media provide less 
12. Myllylahti.
13. Picard.
14. Laying off the editor-in-chief of the NZZ was in itself highly remarkable, because each 
predecessor had filled this position for decades and usually determined himself when to go.
15. Puppis et al.
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context in 2014 than they used to in comparison with the period 2010 
to 2013.16 Furthermore, the structural crisis could lead the media to rely 
more on news factors and to a “push to popularize politics” in order to sat-
isfy (alleged) media consumer needs—a trend which was already observed 
looking at the time period from the mid-1960s to the mid-2000s.17 Some 
of the means to package politics this way are scandalization, personaliza-
tion, or emotionalization, all of which are beneficial for those actors that 
adapt best to this new “media logic.”18 This way, powerful actors that have 
the resources to conduct highly visible campaigns, and generally populist 
actors, which with their issues and their communication style serve the 
media logic, find better chances to build the media agenda with “their” 
issues and “their” messages at the expense of other actors and issues. In 
this sense, the diversity of actors and issues shrinks. In addition to this, 
one can also argue that the recent closeness of two important papers to the 
SVP (Weltwoche, Basler Zeitung) and the pressure that the SVP is able to 
apply even on traditional papers like the NZZ increases the party’s chances 
of finding (favorable) media attention in the overall media arena. Again, 
this structural change is expected to decrease the diversity of actors and 
issues. Before we test which direct-democratic votes actually find media 
attention, we give some reasons why media attention itself is important to 
look at and the possible factors to explain the amount of media attention.
Why Is Media Attention Important and What Drives It?
Assuming that politics is “mediated” and that citizens receive most of their 
information about politics from the mass media, it is clear that news out-
lets should devote attention to direct-democratic votes in order to help cit-
izens take informed decisions. While no one would probably object to this 
statement, the problem becomes a little bit trickier given the fact that in 
 Switzerland, typically several votes take place at the same time. This raises 
the question whether certain votes generate a much higher degree of atten-
tion than others (and why) or whether all votes receive more or less the 
same amount of news coverage. The amount of media attention, and espe-
cially the differences in media attention among votes, is important for a 
16. fög.
17. Umbricht and Esser.
18. Mazzoleni, “Mediated Populism.”
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number of reasons. First, it affects vote choice.19 As Hanspeter Kriesi shows, 
“high-intensity campaigns” that are clearly visible to the public increase 
mobilization and thus affect the voting result (Kriesi takes the number 
of political ads as a yardstick to gauge the visibility and intensity of the 
campaign). High-intensity campaigns also lead to “argumentation-based 
opinions” that are more in line with actual voting behavior, whereas in 
low-intensity votes, people might be more likely to hold opinions on an 
issue but vote the opposite simply because they use other heuristics such 
as party preferences or general trust in government. Empirically, the gov-
ernment position tends to benefit from low-intensity campaigns whereas 
challengers tend to benefit from high-intensity campaigns, as their argu-
ments become more widely visible and accessible.20
Second, the amount of media attention is important for political actors 
involved in a vote, as it affects “issue ownership” in a competitive party 
space.21 This is especially true for challengers, that is, those responsible for 
a vote (e.g., a party that launches its own or that successfully manages to 
fight a government proposal with a referendum), since these are the actors 
that, from an institutional logic, have actively decided to intervene in the 
political process. Hence, challengers are highly interested in generating 
or maintaining “issue ownership” with the issue of the vote at stake; they 
are therefore interested in high media attention. Proponents of the status 
quo (i.e., opponents to the challengers) have ambivalent interests in media 
attention: On one hand, they have an interest that the vote be widely dis-
cussed in the media so their own message (against the challengers) reaches 
the voters, but on the other hand they have an interest in de-emphasizing 
the issue of the challengers and thus lowering media attention, lest the 
challenger is given the opportunity to create or maintain a visible profile 
with the issue.
The crucial question therefore is: What drives media attention and what 
can explain differences in media attention? What makes one vote generate 
the interest of the media, while another vote triggers hardly any media 
attention? In the following paragraphs, we specify possible factors (our 
explanatory variables) and discuss possible hypotheses.
19. Kriesi, Direct Democratic Choice; Bowler and Donovan; Kriesi and Bernhard.
20. Kriesi, Direct Democratic Choice. For an overview of the current research on the role 
of cognition in the opinion-forming process during direct-democratic campaigns, see Milic, 
 Rousselot, and Vatter, 233–62.
21. Wagner and Meyer; Walgrave, Lefevere, and Nuytemans.
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Method: What Drives Media Attention  
and How Do We Measure This?
We rest on the assumption that various news factors have an impact on the 
amount of media attention;22 these news factors in turn can be related to 
“characteristics” of the vote and more general structural factors (e.g., the 
type of challenger). But news factors are not totally inherent to an event 
or an issue; their strength has to be perceived and evaluated by journal-
ists, which is why not all news factors are equally important to all media, 
and media are not equally dependent on news factors.23 Generally, we 
argue that the more media attention depends on these news factors, the 
more we can consider media coverage to be shaped by commercial “media 
logic.” This is because a strong orientation toward these news factors is at 
odds with the normative principles by which the media should be guided. 
 Especially in a direct democracy, a wide variety of actors should have (more 
or less) equal chances to find media attention with their proposals and 
media coverage should not be really skewed toward those votes fulfilling 
as many news factors as possible. Thus, media less shaped by commercial 
imperatives will devote their attention more evenly, and they will not focus 
only on those votes that are launched by the most prominent actors, with 
the most provocative and most visible campaign, or the votes that are most 
attractive to cover simply because poll results anticipate a “close call.”
Against this background, let us now turn to possible explanatory factors 
(our independent variables) for media attention (our dependent variable). 
When discussing these explanatory factors, it is important to bear in mind 
that we assigned each vote a code for each factor, thus classifying the votes 
according to these factors. In the following paragraphs, we list the basic 
idea behind these measurements, and details on how we operationalize 
these factors exactly can be found in the appendix.
To begin with, one could argue that high continuity as a news factor 
increases media attention. Continuity is high when an issue is already 
“familiar” and fulfills expectations on the basis of existing knowledge. Of 
course, knowing that journalists tend to constantly monitor which content 
they themselves and others have been producing, it is reasonable to assume 
that an issue is familiar for journalists when previous media attention on 
the very same issue has been extensive recently. In this sense, media take 
22. Eilders; van Dalen; Udris, Lucht and Schneider.
23. Engelmann, 57.
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into account how intense media attention to an issue had been previously. 
For our analysis, we therefore examine the amount of media attention to 
an issue in a previous phase (six months preceding the “hot phase” of the 
upcoming vote) and expect that the higher media attention in a previous 
phase, the higher media attention in the hot phase of a vote.
Second, another obvious news factor is the importance or “political rel-
evance” of powerful “elite” political actors and institutions.24 Their deci-
sions have a higher reach, which makes them newsworthy.25 In the case of 
direct-democratic votes, which are not primarily about actors and institu-
tions but primarily about issues, one could still argue that votes initiated 
by powerful actors are considered more relevant than votes initiated by 
small minorities and nonestablished actors (e.g., a small association). Thus, 
the higher the status of the challenger (i.e., the actor that initiates the vote), 
the higher the amount of media attention. In a similar line of reasoning, 
one could argue that the amount of political advertising could be used by 
the media as a yardstick of how “relevant” a vote is. In short: if political 
actors—proponents and opponents—invest a lot of money in a campaign, 
this could signal to journalists that the issue at stake is a “relevant” issue 
especially worth fighting about. Ceteris paribus, expensive campaigns are 
expected to lead to more media attention than inexpensive campaigns.
Another important news factor is conflict.26 The more contested and the 
more controversial a vote is, the more the media believe they have reasons 
to cover it. Media attention is expected to intensify if the number of (pow-
erful) political actors involved increases, which increases the scope of this 
problem, the stakes of the actors involved, and the uncertainty of who will 
actually win. Conflict as news factor is multifaceted. It is connected both 
to the news factor of relevance (cf. earlier text) and also to the news factor 
of unexpectedness, which is more in line with a factor that is salient espe-
cially in media following a commercialized media logic. Also relating to a 
more commercialized media logic, conflict as a news factor often stands 
in tandem with news factors such as damage or aggression.27 In this sense, 
conflicts are newsworthy because commercialized media can use them to 
portray politics as an exciting drama.
24. Wolfsfeld, 9–11; Tresch, 71.
25. Eilders, 11.
26. Loc. cit.
27. Loc. cit.
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To operationalize these various facets of conflict, we look at the actors 
and the content behind the conflicts as well as the degree of uncertainty. 
First, as regards actors, we look at the “coalitional configuration,”28 meaning 
which actors actually fight each other on a vote. We hypothesize that a 
high consensus among the important actors is expected to decrease media 
attention, whereas a low consensus and a high conflict among important 
actors, especially between the right-wing populist SVP on the one hand 
and other large parties on the other hand, to increase media attention. In 
addition to conflict factors addressing conflict among parties, the degree of 
party-internal division, thus the conflict within a party, is another import-
ant factor. We expect that the more parties are internally divided on a vote, 
the higher media attention will be.
Looking more at the content of conflicts and the proposals at stake, we 
first examine the conflict type, distinguishing among the basic structural con-
flicts, that is, conflicts in the “cultural” dimension (comprising issues such as 
migration, law and order, minority rights, etc.), in the “economic” dimension 
(comprising issues such as budget, health care, tariffs, etc.), and those (few) 
conflicts that cannot be automatically assigned to either category (e.g., envi-
ronment, traffic).29 We expect conflicts in the “cultural” dimension to gener-
ate more media attention than conflicts in the “ economic” dimension. This 
is because conflicts in the “cultural” dimension have gained in importance in 
several Western European countries. In Switzerland, as in the Netherlands, 
or in Great Britain, but not in Germany and not in France, the cultural cleav-
age has become even the dominant one. Along with the growing importance 
of this conflict axis, a party system has been taking shape where right-wing 
populist parties acquire a distinct profile in opposition to mainstream parties 
from the left and the right.30
Focusing on a second indicator of the content side of conflicts, we 
examine the degree of populism reflected in a proposal because populism 
with its antagonistic relationship of “the people” and “the elite” inherently 
expresses a fundamental conflict and thus is expected to enhance media 
attention. Populism, as defined by the literature, considers the (homoge-
neous) “people” to be good and pure, while at the same time the “elite” is 
denigrated and blamed for affecting the people negatively.31 Populism also 
28. Kriesi, Direct Democratic Choice, 54–58.
29. Dolezal, 60.
30. Grande, 324.
31. van Kessel.
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includes a scandalization of democratic procedures of liberal democracy 
with its checks and balances: typically, popular sovereignty expressed in 
popular votes is considered the main (or even the only) legitimate channel 
of democratic politics.32 In terms of rhetoric, the style of populism usually 
entails the use of “highly emotional, slogan-based, tabloidstyle language,”33 
which aims to “tap feelings of ressentiment and exploit them politically.”34 
All this makes populist proposals highly newsworthy and attractive, espe-
cially to news media following a commercialized media logic. Thus, we 
expect populist proposals to trigger more media attention than popular 
votes not or only partially shaped by a populist proposal.
Finally, addressing conflict in relation to unexpectedness, we argue 
that the (anticipated) closeness of the vote is reflected in media attention. 
We look at results from opinion polls published around six weeks before 
the vote takes place and posit that close results overall correlate with high 
media attention. We also look at the actual official poll results, and again 
we posit that the closer a vote has turned out to be, the higher the media 
attention during the “hot phase.”
After discussing these possible explanatory factors, we now turn to 
media attention as our main dependent variable. To examine which fac-
tors drive media attention to direct-democratic votes, we look at the latest 
twenty-nine votes in Switzerland on the national level (March 2013–June 
2015), which took place on ten different days. We captured all news articles 
dealing with these votes in a period of eleven weeks each, thus capturing 
the “hot phase” of a campaign. We started twelve weeks before voting day 
and captured the following eleven weeks. (In the last week before voting 
day, there is usually very little media coverage, also because a high number 
of citizens votes by mail, which they send out some weeks before voting 
day.) We analyzed media coverage in eight newspapers. To give justice to 
the segmented press market in Switzerland, we incorporated different press 
types. This is why we included three daily subscription papers, among 
which two are considered Switzerland’s “best” or high-quality newspapers 
and one Switzerland’s largest “mid-market” paper, the two largest daily 
tabloids, the largest free commuter paper (which is also the largest news-
paper in Switzerland in terms of circulation), and two Sunday papers, 
32. Mudde and Kaltwasser.
33. Mazzoleni, “The Media,” 5.
34. Betz, 198.
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among which one is a “high-quality” Sunday newspaper and the other is 
the  largest one.
We coded news articles with a whole set of variables such as tone of 
coverage, and so on, which we use for our case study (cf. the follow-
ing sections) but for the purposes of our overall comparative analysis, 
we focus on the intensity of news coverage. As a proxy for how much 
media attention a vote generates, we use the number of articles. We 
cross-checked the number of articles for each vote with other possible 
indicators of media attention such as prominence (front-page articles vs. 
others) and length (number of characters). The distribution of media 
attention among the twenty-nine votes is basically the same when we 
look at the number of front-page articles (11 percent of the total sample) 
and at the number of articles not on the front page (Pearson’s r = 0.97). 
Similarly, the number of articles for each vote highly correlates with 
the number of characters, a proxy for article length (Pearson’s r = 0.99). 
Thus, we are safe to assume that the number of articles is a simple but 
valid indicator of media attention.
Results: Media Coverage about Direct-Democratic Votes  
in a Comparative Perspective
A first analysis of media attention (cf. Figure 1) shows that media attention 
to direct-democratic votes is distributed unevenly across the votes. The ini-
tiative against “mass immigration” by the right-wing populist SVP gener-
ates around twelve times more attention than the referendum initiated by 
left-wing parties against extended opening hours for shops in gas stations 
or eleven times more attention than the student initiative for increasing 
stipends. This already is an important finding, as the actively promoted 
initiative by the right-wing populist SVP manages to trigger most media 
attention by far.
To explain the differences in media attention more systematically, we 
used the factors listed earlier (more details on the operationalization can 
be found in the appendix) and used them to build regression models.35 
We started with “previous media attention” in a first model because the 
35. We controlled for outliers by alternatively transforming the interval scale (number of arti-
cles) into an ordinal scale with four steps. This approach yields the same results as in the models 
presented here, which is why we keep our dependent variable as an interval scale.
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figure 1 Media Attention to Direct-Democratic Votes
Note: The vote on the revision of public broadcasting (our case study) is indicated in orange.
news factor “continuity” is expected to play an important role and because 
with this factor, we take into account an autocorrelation effect. This first 
model shows that previous media attention has a clear effect on media 
attention in the “hot phase” (B = 0.716, S.E. = 0.161; p = 0.000) and shows 
relatively strong explanatory power (adjusted R2 = 0.401). After having dis-
cussed this first simple model, we then began again with all ten variables 
(cf.  Appendix) in a full model (adjusted R2 = 0.760) and used a backward 
model selection procedure. Step-wise, we excluded those variables whose 
effect was not significant. This results in the following model, which is 
displayed in Figure 2.
In the final model, apart from the effect of previous media attention, 
another three out of ten variables show an effect (cf. Figure 2). Compared 
to the first model described earlier (consisting only of “previous media 
attention”), the final model has a significantly higher explanatory power 
(adjusted R2 = 0.775 vs. 0.401). Above all, political advertising expenditures 
go hand in hand with media attention. Second, conflicts in the cultural 
dimension receive more media attention than do conflicts not belonging 
to any of the two conflict dimensions (e.g., traffic) and socio-economic 
conflicts. Third, proposals with a higher level of populism are those with 
higher media attention.
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Before we discuss these relevant factors in more detail and try to find 
causal mechanisms, we show which factors have turned out not to be 
 significant and which have therefore been excluded from the final model.
The status of the challengers according to their formal status in the polit-
ical system is not significant. This means that neither powerful actors per 
se nor peripheral challengers per se (the “Davids” against the “Goliaths”) 
can generate especially high or especially low media attention with “their” 
vote.36 To illustrate this, we can point at the two initiatives with largest 
36. Again, we have to stress that our dependent variable, media attention, is a rough measure 
of the overall attention to a vote, regardless of who or what actually triggers a single article out 
of the total of articles. We make no claims as to which actors dominate news coverage within 
a certain vote. This way, the initiative of a political party could find high media attention but 
the actor who promotes the initiative does not necessarily, because it is rather other (opposing) 
political actors who react to this initiative. This was the case, for instance, in the Ecopop initia-
tive, which was launched by a nonestablished political organization, but which was intensively 
attacked by most established parties.
figure 2 Regression Model with Factors Explaining Media Attention on  
Direct- Democratic Votes
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media attention: The initiative against “mass immigration” is launched by 
the largest party (high status), but the initiative against “excessive exec-
utive pay” is launched by a single member of Parliament who does not 
even belong to a party (lower status). Low media attention is awarded not 
only to an initiative launched by a small student organization (low status) 
(“increasing stipends”), confirming the hypothesis, but also to an initiative 
launched by an established government party, the Christian Democratic 
People’s Party (CVP) (“family initiative”), against the hypothesis.
Regarding conflict factors, which we operationalized with seven vari-
ables, most variables do not explain much. It does not matter how close 
or contested the vote was in Parliament according to voting behavior 
by members of Parliament (the lower chamber usually votes on whether 
it officially supports a direct-democratic proposal or not). Furthermore, 
the “coalitional configuration” as such and the according “official” voting 
recommendation by parties does not play a role. Thus, it is not import-
ant whether and how the large parties in government are divided on a 
vote, for instance whether the vote mirrors a “center-left” conflict (Social 
Democratic Party [SP], Radical Democratic Party [FDP], and CVP 
against SVP), a totally divided coalition (e.g., SP and CVP vs. FDP and 
SVP), a “center-right” conflict (CVP, FDP, and SVP against SP) or a 
“grand coalition” where all these four parties are either against or for a 
proposal. Not even the amount of party-internal division has an effect on 
media attention.
Similarly, conflict factors relating even more to unexpectedness, uncer-
tainty, and the “horse race” aspect of journalism fail to explain differences 
in media attention. Here, one could possibly expect that, if the media 
anticipate a close race, this would increase the likelihood of reporting. 
However, the actual closeness of the vote (measured as actual vote results) 
alone does not play a role, and neither does the closeness according to 
opinion polls, which are published six weeks before the vote.
Thus, our final model suggests that continuity is important, that is, high 
previous media attention leads to high media attention in the “hot phase,” 
and so is “relevance” according to how much money campaign actors invest 
(whether pro or con). Conflict, which in several respects does not show 
an effect, is still important in two respects: first, populist proposals, that 
is, those proposals that express rather fundamental conflicts of “either-or” 
instead of conflicts of “more-or-less,”37 stand better chances of finding 
37. Hirschman, 213.
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media attention. Second, direct-democratic campaigns dealing with a 
“ cultural” conflict (e.g., migration, law and order, media policy) are more 
readily picked up by the media than other conflicts.
On the basis of which factors empirically cluster typically and which 
factors correlate with each other, we see, for instance, that populist pro-
posals (six votes) are rather “cultural” conflicts than economic conflicts 
(four vs. two votes), and actors behind these votes are either clear outsiders 
(three votes), the more radical Youth Section of the Social Democrats (one 
vote), or the established right-wing populist party SVP (two votes). For 
political actors, this implies that launching populist proposals is a success-
ful strategy if the main goal of these actors is to trigger media attention.
In our statistical model comprising twenty-nine cases, it is not possible 
to finally solve the problem of reciprocity and test further causal mecha-
nisms. As regards the effect of previous media attention, we see that it not 
only correlates with media attention in the hot phase, but also with adver-
tising expenditures (Pearson’s r = .462, p = 0.012). In terms of causality, 
there is some support for an interpretation in which previous media atten-
tion influences political advertising and not the other way round. After all, 
advertising campaigns have to be planned beforehand, and if media atten-
tion in the “hot phase” within eleven weeks (unexpectedly) develops in a 
way unfavorable to a campaign actor, this actor cannot suddenly increase 
the campaign budget substantially.
As we are left with the effect of previous media attention, we would 
have to wonder which cues the media got in that earlier phase to gauge 
the relevance of an issue. Again, given the fact that most “structural fac-
tors” such as status of challengers or the “coalitional configuration” do not 
explain much, while the level of populism, cultural conflicts, and advertis-
ing expenditures do, it is more reasonable to assume that both the media 
and campaign actors together in a sort of an ongoing “feedback loop” con-
stitute the salience and thus the “relevance” of an issue both over a longer 
period of time and then again during the “hot phase” of the campaign.
Given this likely ongoing “coproduction” between media and actors 
with large campaign resources, this finding becomes even more relevant 
considering that advertising expenditures are highly skewed in three ways. 
First, in each vote, usually one camp invests much more in political ads than 
the other camp. In the case of the twenty-nine votes, one camp on average 
spends 83 percent of all money invested in a vote, while the other camp 
spends only 17 percent. Second, advertising expenditures are highly skewed 
toward political (and economic) actors from the right. Third, focusing only 
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on political parties, the bulk of advertising  expenditures is spent by the SVP. 
We can substantiate these claims by giving only estimates, since the data 
does not allow us to assign all ads to a clearly identifiable actor. In many 
cases, there is only data indicating which ad hoc coalition invests money in 
an ad (e.g., Committee for the Revision of the Broadcasting Law), making 
it impossible to say how much money a certain party within an ad hoc 
coalition invests. In the data, 56 percent of advertising expenditures come 
from political parties from the right and economic organizations (we know 
this also because this sum comes from campaigns directed at proposals 
launched by left-wing actors), while 6 percent can be clearly assigned to 
actors from the left (e.g., Social Democratic Party, unions). Thirty-eight 
percent are unclear (e.g., opposition from both left-wing and right-wing 
parties, with the exact share being unknown). In those cases where political 
ads clearly can be attributed to a specific party, again we see that the SVP 
spends most money: While it spends around 3 million Swiss Francs overall, 
the Liberal Democrats spend around 2.5 million, the  Christian Democrats 
around 1 million, the Social Democrats around 250,000, and the Green 
Party around 125,000 Swiss Francs.
These results are perfectly in line with a study by Michael Hermann, 
who analyzed advertising expenditures between 2005 and 2011, including 
direct-democratic campaign periods, election periods, and periods outside 
of these concrete campaign periods. Hermann also found that left-wing 
actors are heavily outspent by political actors from the right, especially by 
the SVP and the large economic associations such as Economiesuisse.38 If 
media attention depends partially on the amount of campaign resources, 
this in turn means that the SVP and economic organizations have better 
chances to increase visibility to a vote they are interested in (whether in 
promoting a proposal or fighting it) than other actors. Thus, political com-
munication in Switzerland faces a double challenge: Not only is the financ-
ing of political campaigns largely nontransparent—Switzerland is regularly 
criticized by the Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption 
for this—but available resources are distributed unevenly among political 
actors.
In terms of party politics, the findings of the model are highly relevant 
as conflicts in the cultural dimension are those where empirically the right-
wing populist party SVP has acquired a clear profile and positioned itself 
38. Hermann and Nowak.
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against most other parties, further legitimizing its use of antiestablishment 
rhetoric against all the other “mainstream” parties.39 In this sense, whether 
the SVP itself leads cost-intensive and (more or less) populist campaigns 
or other actors lead intensive countercampaigns against the SVP, it means 
that the issues that the SVP has come to “own”40 generate especially high 
visibility.
All in all, then, the data show that the amount of media attention to a 
substantial degree centers around a populist party, the SVP. In this sense, 
one must conclude that news coverage about direct-democratic campaigns 
shows a reduced level of diversity concerning issues and actors. In their 
coverage of direct-democratic votes, the media do not break this cycle and 
do not manage to offer a more balanced reporting about these various 
issues that are up for the vote.
Case Study: “Vote on the Revision of Broadcasting Law”
In the overall analysis described earlier, we learned two things. Political 
advertising correlates with media attention and populist proposals and 
votes in the cultural conflict dimension increase media attention, especially 
when Switzerland’s largest party, the right-wing populist SVP is highly 
involved, either because it is internally divided (which was the case in two 
votes) or because it invests even more money on a campaign than it does 
for other votes. Our case study, the vote on the revision of broadcasting 
law, fits exactly this pattern. It generates media attention above average, 
and political advertising expenditures are also above average, albeit slightly. 
The content of the vote takes the form of a cultural conflict because it 
deals with media policy, where for decades the right-wing populist party 
SVP has been positioning itself as a vocal critic of the (allegedly) left-wing 
public broadcaster, whereas the other three large mainstream (center-right) 
parties have been clear supporters of public broadcasting. Also, the ref-
erendum against this law was initiated by the Swiss Federation of Small 
and Medium Enterprises (Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband), a powerful 
economic interest organization with close ties to the SVP (the president 
of this organization is a member of Parliament of the SVP). Overall, this 
39. Kriesi et al.
40. Udris.
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makes it a highly representative case to study in more details the patterns 
of news coverage. At the same time, this is a special case where the media 
are directly affected by the law. This raises the question whether media’s 
own interests are additional factors that explain not only media attention 
to this vote but the overall tone and style of news coverage.
A few words are necessary to describe the content of the vote. In June 
2015, Swiss people voted on a revision of Broadcasting Law. In Switzerland, 
not only public broadcasting but also private broadcasting is regulated. The 
regulation concerns not only what is expected from broadcasters in terms 
of content to be produced but also the financing (who receives and who 
needs to pay how much?). As concerns the content and the related public 
service functions broadcasters should fulfill, the revision practically did not 
change anything. As concerns who receives license fees, the revision meant 
that the public broadcaster SRG (Swiss Broadcasting Corporation) would 
still get by far the largest share (more than 90 percent), and private broad-
casters, obliged to offer regional news, would receive a slightly larger share of 
the whole revenue than before (in sum between 4 and 6 percent instead 
of 3 to 5 percent). Compared to the financing of public broadcasting, this 
overall growth could be considered non-substantial; however, on the level 
of individual broadcasters, given that they usually have a relatively small 
budget, this growth would mean around 10 or 20 percent of a broadcaster’s 
revenue income, which then does not seem non- substantial. Finally, as 
concerns who needs to pay for the license fee, the revision would bring 
substantial changes. The overall sum of license fees should stay the same, 
but the division of who needs to pay would change. In the old version, 
every household and every company was required to pay for a license fee 
once a year only provided they had access to a device with which content 
by public or private broadcasters could be received and used. If a house-
hold (or a company) did not use this content—or at least claimed they did 
not use it—they could opt out and would not have to pay. In the revised 
law, this opting-out principle was given up; all households and all compa-
nies (but, in the revised law, only those with a minimal size, i.e., a minimal 
business volume of 500,000 CHF) would have to pay for a license fee. In 
sum, households overall would benefit financially, since the new fee was 
announced to be around 400 CHF instead of around 460 CHF a year. 
Also, while companies overall would have to share a higher burden than 
before, the revised law would shift the burden from smaller companies to 
bigger companies because of a progressive fee system (plus an exemption 
from the license fee if the business volume was lower than 500,000 CHF).
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As for the media covering this vote, it is clear that this law affects them 
directly. This is true not only for news organizations that own regional 
radio and TV stations and which would benefit from the new law. It is also 
true for news organizations in general in the current crisis of journalism, 
where private news organizations face increasing commercial pressures due 
to dwindling audience and advertising revenues. With the audience shifts 
toward online news media (and social media such as Facebook), a growing 
convergence and similarly a growing competition emerges in the online 
sector. News organizations, which formally had worked in different media 
sectors, now compete in the online sector. This explains, for instance, part 
of the conflict between the public broadcaster SRG and private media 
organizations—because all actors attempt to find users offering media 
content online.
No matter whether private media organizations are threatened more 
by the public broadcasters’ activities online or by large international cor-
porations such as Google or Facebook that have the upper hand in gen-
erating advertising revenue online, from a normative perspective, media 
in their coverage should foster the public good and offer a fair and trans-
parent coverage instead of promoting particular interests.41 Commercial 
imperatives, it is argued, increasingly reduce this public good orienta-
tion.42 In an important strand of the literature, scholars analyze to what 
extent media foster the public good by critically reporting on how other 
media are covering important issues or by critically reporting on issues 
that directly affect them (media policy issues).43 Many scholars observe 
a decline of “media journalism” or “media critique,” even though the 
media increasingly tend to observe each other constantly to gauge which 
topics are relevant and with which stories an outlet could have an edge 
over competitors.44
In this context, scholars observe that a typical news outlet tends 
not to cover itself and its related media organization critically enough 
41. Dybski et al.
42. For an overview, see Fortunato.
43. In another strand of the literature, scholars analyze the effect of public relations of eco-
nomic actors on news coverage. One looming question, especially in the view of the current crisis 
of journalism, is to what extent news coverage about a company depends on how much money 
this company invests in advertising in a given news oulet. In order to please advertisers, media 
avoid cricitizing the hand that feeds them. Porlezza; Gadringer et al.
44. Reinemann and Huismann.
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(transparency and self-observation).45 Stephan Russ-Mohl, for instance, 
argues that basic journalistic rules are threatened when interests of a 
media organization come into play.46 This is because media tend to 
cover its “own” media organization more positively than others, either 
neglecting competitors or portraying them more critically.47 In the still 
rare empirical studies on how media actually cover themselves and other 
media, Pointner, for instance, looked at media coverage about media 
organizations over more than a decade (1992–2006) and concluded that 
this type of media coverage is increasingly shaped by commercial imper-
atives.48 Press outlets report more critically about broadcasting than on 
(other) press outlets, and media coverage about outlets belonging to the 
same media organization is less critical still. Ralph Weiss also observed 
that press outlets in Germany cover (public) broadcasting quite criti-
cally.49 Similarly, news outlets shy away from media policy issues that 
could be harmful to their owners.50 In a case study on a takeover in 
the media sector, Beatrice Kemner showed that the media coverage is 
shaped by interests of the related media organizations.51 Not only the 
intensity, but also the tone of coverage is shaped by the interest of an 
outlet and its related media organization. In another study, Catie Snow 
Bailard provided  similar insights by analyzing news coverage about the 
controversial  Citizens United ruling by the Supreme Court, which loos-
ened restrictions on campaign spending and led to a remarked increase 
in expenditures on television advertising. She showed that “corporations 
with more television stations, which equates to more airtime to sell to 
political advertisers, were significantly more likely to mention positive 
consequences associated with the Citizens United ruling compared to 
companies with fewer or no television stations, and they were also some-
what less likely to mention negative consequences relative to their coun-
terparts who stood to gain less financially from the ruling.”52
Apart from economic self-interests on the level of news organizations, 
factors on the individual level could also play a role in this process. In a 
45. Malik.
46. Russ-Mohl.
47. Russ-Mohl and Fengler; Schmidt.
48. Pointner.
49. Weiss.
50. Schejter and Obar.
51. Kemner, Scherer, and Weinacht.
52. Bailard, 12.
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commercialized and highly concentrated media system, journalists would 
rather hold back with criticism of their own organization, lest they get 
sanctioned, possibly even losing their job and having few alternative orga-
nizations to turn to in order to find another job.53 In a recent study by 
Manuel Puppis and colleagues, Swiss journalists surveyed indicated it was 
clear to them that they would (have to) report positively about their own 
media organization, while critical reports about their own organization 
were not possible.54
To analyze whether a news organization’s own interests shape news 
coverage in the case when news organizations are themselves directly 
affected, we classify media organizations along their supposed interests 
in the revision of the broadcasting law, including the discussion about 
the public broadcaster SRG. We then set this classification in relation 
to the actual tone of coverage we can identify in several news outlets 
belonging to these media organizations. For this case study, we extended 
the media sample to twenty-six news outlets and slightly extended the 
time period (cf. Appendix).
On a five-point scale, we tried to position news organizations (and their 
related news outlets) and their expected stance toward the vote (and thus, 
the public broadcaster SRG), from “very negative” to “slightly negative,” 
“balanced,” “slightly positive,” and “very positive.” For this scale, we con-
sider political interests—the cases of Weltwoche and Basler Zeitung with 
close ties to the SVP, a vehement critic of public broadcasting—and eco-
nomic interests, which we operationalize according to two factors. First, 
we ask whether a media organization would benefit from the revised law 
financially (by owning private broadcasting stations), and second, we ask 
to what extent a media organization considers the public broadcaster to 
be a (threatening) competitor, especially regarding SRG’s online activi-
ties that allegedly undermine the possibility of private media organizations 
to generate enough revenue with newspaper Internet sites—important as 
readership numbers of printed versions dwindle and advertising revenue in 
53. Trappel et al. Interestingly, in the Swiss case, the right-wing populist paper Weltwoche 
argues that because the public broadcaster SRG is allegedly so powerful in a concentrated media 
system, journalists would not want to criticize the SRG because it was each journalist’s dream to 
end up working for the public broadcaster. Empirically, however, the SRG is actually the media 
organization in Switzerland with the most negative coverage.
54. Puppis et al.
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the press sector is shrinking.55 Brief explanations for this categorization of 
the media organizations are given in the appendix. For instance, we expect 
a negative tone of coverage, albeit only a “slightly negative” coverage, in 
outlets of Switzerland’s private media organization NZZ Mediengruppe. 
On one hand, it shares economic interests similar to Tamedia and Ringier 
in the online sector (SRG as a competitor) but on the other hand, it owns 
regional radio and TV stations that would benefit financially from the law. 
However, those TV stations are not very important in the organization’s 
business strategy. Thus, we would expect a criticism of the SRG but a pro-
motion of the law itself—in sum a “slightly negative” coverage.
The tone of coverage—our dependent variable—was measured on the 
article level. We coded either a “positive,” “negative,” or “controversial” 
tone on the basis what the main message of the article was in relation to 
the revised law and/or in relation to the public broadcaster. For each news 
outlet, we calculated a “tone of coverage index,” where we subtracted the 
number of articles with “negative” tone from the number of articles with 
“positive” tone, then divided this number by the number of all articles by 
a news outlet (thus, also including the articles with “controversial” tone) 
and finally multiplied this value by one hundred. In Table 1, we display the 
average values of the “tone of coverage index” in those cases where we have 
more than one news outlet in one group (e.g., the group of news outlets 
and related news organizations that are expected to show a “slightly nega-
tive” tone of coverage).
Table 1 shows that political and economic interests indeed correlate 
with the tone of coverage. News outlets with a higher interest in a rejec-
tion of the proposal show a substantially more negative coverage than 
those news outlets with a higher interest in the proposal being accepted 
(p = 0.0008). There is some variance within media organizations, and it 
seems that in the case of NZZ Mediengruppe, AZ Medien, and Tamedia, 
the “flagship” paper tends to be more balanced compared with other news 
55. To the surprise of all media experts and journalists, Ringier announced in August 2015, 
two months after the vote, that it would enter a partnership with the public broadcaster SRG 
and the telecom company Swisscom, creating a vehicle for managing and marketing advertising 
together. Given this, Ringier’s official position toward the SRG has obviously and suddenly 
shifted in a more positive direction since August 2015. For the actual news coverage in the run-up 
to the vote of June 2015, however, we would argue that journalists at the time of writing were not 
aware of the management’s (secret) negotiations with the SRG. Most likely, journalists would 
still have had in mind what their CEO had said as late as March 2015 in a public hearing, namely 
that the SRG distorts competition and that it should be curtailed.
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outlets (NZZ,  Aargauer  Zeitung, and Tages-Anzeiger) (not displayed). In 
this sense, quality orientation and an orientation toward the public good 
in a news outlet could be a buffer toward interests on the level of a media 
organization. All in all, however, the results are fairly clear, and differences 
are significant. Also, if we group together those outlets with expected neg-
ative coverage (“very negative” and “slightly negative”) and those with 
balanced and (slightly) positive coverage, again we see significant differ-
ences (t-test: p = 0.033). The tone of coverage is significantly more positive 
in the “positive” news outlets (avg. 7.1) than in “negative” news outlets 
(avg. –18.2).56 This correlation between own interests and the tone of cov-
erage is quite substantial, with Pearson’s r being 0.394 (p = 0.046) and 
Spearman’s ρ being 0.390 (p = 0.049).
In more qualitative terms, we looked at arguments exchanged in the media 
and we saw a clear pattern. The overall focus of media coverage was not on 
the core revision itself but on the role of the public broadcaster. Typically, this 
discussion about public broadcasting took the form of a problematization of 
the SRG. Statements criticizing the budget of the SRG, the “excessive” pay 
56. A t-test for average values gives the following results: t = 2.264; df = 24; p = 0.033; differ-
ence in average value = 25.33600; difference in standard error = 11.19087.
table 1 Own Interests and Tone of News Coverage about the Revision of Broadcasting Law
Own Interests and Their Expected Effect on News Coverage
Very 
 negative
Slightly 
negative
Balanced Slightly 
positive
Very 
positive
Total
Tone of coverage
Index (average value 
of outlets)
−17.6 −21.5 9.0 −2.1 29.4 −11.4
Positive tone 75 15 4 29 9 132
Controversial/neutral 
tone
104 40 12 26 4 186
Negative tone 135 30 2 28 4 199
Number of articles 
(total)
314 85 18 83 17 517
Number of news 
outlets
16 3 3 3 1 26
Number of media 
organizations
4 1 1 1 1 8
Note: Chi-square: 26.7785; df = 8; p = 0.0008.
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awarded to the top management, or the “dominance” of the SRG compared 
to private media were more common than statements pointing at the pos-
itive role the SRG plays in guaranteeing a public service. Also, we have to 
bear in mind the vote overall generated media attention that is above average 
(cf. Figure 1). Given this finding, one can conclude already that opponents 
of the law, including the media, managed to shift the focus of the vote away 
from a discussion on who needs to pay how much to a broad discussion on 
whether the public broadcaster SRG should actually receive (so) much.
Whenever the new model itself came into focus, it was rather the propo-
nents’ arguments that find media attention than the opponents’ arguments. 
This is in line with the discursive strategies of the pro-camp, which tried to 
stress the practicability of the new financing system and the advantages for 
households. For instance, the proponents advanced the argument that with 
the new model, one household would have to pay around 60 CHF less a 
year than now; this was broadly reflected in the media. The reason why the 
pro-camp all in all still used more arguments focusing on the SRG than on 
the model itself is simply because the pro-camp had to react to the public 
service debate that the con-camp had successfully launched.
One case in point is the reaction to the campaign of the challengers, 
who, one has to remember, invested more than twice as much than the 
proponents of the law (1.3 million vs. around 500,000 Swiss Francs). In 
a provocative leaflet sent to all Swiss households, the right-wing Swiss 
Federation of Small and Medium Enterprises (responsible for the referen-
dum) depicted the director of the SRG in a cartoon as a cross-eyed, greedy 
 figure that fills his pockets with money. In the text, the director is explicitly 
accused of “stealing from the people.” In a gruesome-looking photograph, 
it showed bloody and distorted fingers caught in a mouse trap, which was 
meant to illustrate that the alleged reduced license fee for households is a 
trap, eventually leading to higher “coercive fees” or “taxes” for households 
because the SRG would use a yes vote as a legitimization to extend its 
programming and then demand even higher license fees.  Especially when 
the media learned that this campaign was designed by the same advertising 
agency that for years has been supporting the campaigns of the right-wing 
populist SVP, criticism amounted quickly. For example, even the president 
of Switzerland explicitly addressed the campaign and condemned it for its 
style as “disquieting, even dangerous” for Switzerland’s political culture.57 
On one hand, scandalizing this campaign supported the pro-side but on 
57. Blick.
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the other hand, as with every truly populist campaign, it generated exactly 
this kind of media attention that populist campaigners actually want. Not 
only did it increase the salience of the issue as such, but it also allowed 
populists to play the successful game of being “unfairly” attacked by the 
(allegedly left-wing) media, whose motives were only to divert atten-
tion away from the “real” issue. This provocative leaflet then is a perfect 
example of how “paid media” successfully generate “free media” and how 
provocative, populist campaign strategies manage to find attention in a 
commercialized media system.58
To conclude, our analysis suggests how successfully the Swiss  Federation 
of Small and Medium Enterprises in tandem with the right-wing populist 
party and with the help of private media and their non-explicit political 
and economic self-interests manage to shape news coverage.
Conclusion
This article started from the assumption that the current structural crisis 
of the news media in Switzerland has detrimental effects on news cover-
age. Taking as an example news coverage about twenty-nine recent direct- 
democratic campaigns, usually praised as a “routine business” for news 
media, it showed that media attention to these various votes is not dis-
tributed equally at all. Of course, no one would expect the news media to 
devote their attention perfectly equally on issues, but the analysis suggests 
that the diversity of issues (here: votes) is restricted. With regression anal-
yses, it showed that media attention does not depend on the actual status 
of the challengers or the level of conflict according to how many parties 
are divided on a vote. Media attention increases when the media have 
already reported extensively in a previous phase, when the proposal is at 
least partially populist in character, when it deals with a “cultural” conflict 
instead of an “economic” conflict and when political actors increase their 
advertising expenditures. This is an indication that media and resourceful 
campaign actors co-orient each other in gauging how “important” a vote 
is—a finding that is supported in the literature on the agenda-building 
58. Since expenditures on this specific form of political advertising, the “direct mailing,” 
are not even collected by Mediafocus, advertising expenditures on the RTVG revision are most 
likely even underestimated.
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capacities of powerful political actors in Switzerland.59 Since advertising 
expenditures are very unevenly distributed in each vote and generally 
among political parties, our findings imply that political (and economic) 
actors with large campaign resources manage to increase media attention. 
Also, actors launching populist proposals find better chances for “their” 
issue to be covered by the media (partially also because other actors react 
intensively to these proposals). Empirically, only the right-wing populist 
party SVP fulfills both criteria: it leads populist campaigns and it uses the 
largest campaign resources. Overall, the importance of campaign resources 
and the level of populism does not mean yet that actors with these strat-
egies and resources are necessarily successful in actually winning the vote, 
but one important condition, that is, a high salience of a vote, is fulfilled 
already.
Our article also showed that votes in the field of “identity poli-
tics” addressing the “integration–demarcation” cleavage trigger large 
media attention, and whenever the right-wing populist SVP is highly 
involved—either because of party-internal division (conflict about 
whether to support a nonestablished actor that “stole” the issue of immi-
gration by launching another initiative) or because it invests substan-
tially more in a vote than it does normally—media attention increases. 
Together, this means that media coverage to a large extent centers around 
the SVP, stressing the importance the media (and other actors) ascribe to 
this party and their “own” issues. We believe that the current structural 
crisis facilitates these trends, as these types of conflict and the provoc-
ative campaign strategies by the populist radical right are newsworthy 
because they fulfill the “media logic.”
In a case study focusing on a vote on the revision of broadcasting 
law, we showed some of the same mechanisms involved, and we added 
another factor that explains the amount of media attention to the vote 
and the arguments exchanged: political and economic self-interests by 
private media organizations. In addition to being receptive to an expen-
sive and highly provocative campaign conducted by an economic orga-
nization (and a campaign organization) with close ties to the SVP, also 
because these types of campaign are generally newsworthy, the media 
seem to have followed their own political and economic self-interests 
in this vote. More so than before, the public broadcaster SRG was 
attacked by the (private) media and stylized as a problem that threatens 
59. Hänggli.
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private media in this current structural crisis; the law was attacked on 
the grounds that it would illegitimately further privilege the private 
broadcaster in an era of media convergence. In contrast to that, media 
organizations that would actually benefit from the law, as they own pri-
vate regional broadcasting stations that would also receive some more 
money, reported substantially more positively. In general, own interests 
were hardly made transparent in news coverage. In this case, news cov-
erage in the form of general “media logic” was supplemented with an 
interest-driven coverage, which overall did not meet the criteria of a fair 
and balanced debate.
Of course, this study has some limitations that need to be addressed. 
One point concerns the dependent variable of our overall comparative 
analysis, media attention. In our article, we have given several reasons 
why we think it is necessary to focus primarily on media attention. But, 
naturally, the characteristics of media coverage also entail other import-
ant elements such as the tone of coverage (as we examined in the case 
study), actors quoted or journalistic “routine frames” such as personal-
ization, scandalization, and so on. These elements, we believe, cannot be 
captured by quantitative analysis alone, also because they receive their 
meaning mainly through the actual dynamics of a campaign. Following 
this, we plan for more qualitative case studies for each of the votes, which 
in turn makes it difficult to obtain a large number of votes. Another point 
is the number of votes for which we have both data on political adver-
tising and on media content; while twenty-nine votes are too many to 
conduct in-depth qualitative analyses for all the votes, this number at the 
same time allows only very basic statistical tests. Thus, a further step of 
the analysis could be adding another method that fits the size of n cases 
(e.g., qualitative comparative analysis). Finally, in our case study, we have 
tried to  operationalize  self-interests of media organizations based on doc-
ument analyses (e.g., business reports). Ideally, however, expert interviews 
of media managers would be an important addition in order to validate 
this operationalization.
Still, we believe that our study is a first step toward a systematic, com-
parative analysis of direct-democratic votes that comes at a critical time 
for journalism in Switzerland. All in all, our article shows that not all is 
well in the state of Switzerland when it comes to how one of its corner-
stones, direct democracy, is conveyed in the mass media. Against this 
background, it seems more necessary than ever to find ways to solve the 
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current  structural crisis of journalism and to find ways to deal with the 
glaring inequalities in the financial resources that political actors have at 
their  disposal to lead political campaigns.
appendix
This appendix gives more details regarding the media sample and oper-
ationalization of the independent and dependent variables used in this 
article.
Overall analysis
Media sample:
Eleven weeks during “hot phase” (twelve weeks before voting day up until 
one week before voting day) 
Eight news outlets: Subscription papers (NZZ, Tages-Anzeiger, Le Temps 
[F]), Commuter paper (20 Minuten), Tabloids (Blick, Le Matin [F]), 
 Sunday papers (NZZ am Sonntag, SonntagsZeitung)
(an “F” indicates an outlet from French-speaking Switzerland)
Independent variables Explanation
Previous media attention This variable measures media attention to the issues the vote 
focuses on, taking the number of articles. It includes six months 
preceding the “hot phase” of the campaign before a vote (= the 
phase where media attention is the dependent variable). Data 
come from an ongoing project at [removed for blind review] 
where six daily papers from German- and French-speaking 
Switzerland are analyzed on a daily basis and where each article 
is assigned to an “issue.”
Minimum 3 articles on “Law on Epidemics,” maximum 
308 articles on possible legal restrictions on immigration  
to Switzerland (previous phase before vote on Ecopop 
 initiative); average 65 articles, median 30 articles,  
SD = 80.4 articles.
Status challenger Four types (ordinal): (1) nonestablished individual or citizen 
group (2 votes); (2) peripheral association or peripheral party 
(11); (3) large, powerful association, factions of an established 
party (7); and (4) established party (9).
Own evaluation.
(Continued )
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Independent variables Explanation
Political advertising Expenditures in Swiss Francs; data come from Mediafocus, 
which analyzes all ads in the press and newspaper Internet sites 
and on billboards; calculation based on the usual price for an 
ad (gross).
Minimum 18,849 CHF (Initiative Ban on Pedophiles); 
 maximum 8,434,724 CHF (Initiative “against mass immigra-
tion”); average 2,144,455 CHF; median 1,725,186 CHF;  
SD = 2,176,195.
Coalitional configuration Four types (nominal): “center-left” (SVP taking a different stance 
than the other three large gov’t parties) (9 votes); “center-right” 
(10) (Social Democrats taking a different stance than the other 
three large gov’t parties); “divided coalition” (9) (at least two out 
of the large four gov’t parties with a different stance); “grand 
coalition” (all four large gov’t parties with the same stance) 
(1). Measured regarding the official positions of the four large 
government parties.
Own evaluation based on Kriesi, Direct Democratic Choice.
Conflict type Three types (ordinal): “cultural” (15 votes), “economic” (10), 
“other” (4).
“Cultural” conflicts include votes on immigration, asylum, 
(traditional) family models, abortion, crime (pedophiles), army, and 
media policy.
“Economic” conflicts include votes on health care, tax privileges, 
energy taxes, regulation of executive pay, regulation of salaries, etc.
“Other” conflicts include votes on traffic or the regulation of 
area planning.
Own evaluation based on Dolezal, “The Design of the Study.”
Populist proposal Three types (ordinal): “populist” (6 votes), “partly populist” (6), 
“not populist” (17).
The categorization was done on the basis of the official 
 statements of the responsible committees that launched 
a proposal (initiative or referendum). These statements 
can be accessed at the official website of Parliament where 
 parliamentary services collected for each vote a document with 
“argumentations” from each committee.
Indicators of a populist proposal are: positive valorization of 
“the people”; antiestablishment statements in general (e.g., against 
“the elite,” “the media,” “the fat-cats”); statements pointing at the 
urgency of a problem which has been (illegitimately) neglected 
by “the elite”; statements stressing a higher importance and 
binding power of the popular vote in comparison with checks and 
 balances such as decisions by Parliament, by judges, etc.
Own evaluation.
(Continued )
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Independent variables Explanation
Conflict National Council This variable measures how much support a challenger’s 
proposal (and thus against the majority) receives in the lower 
chamber of the Swiss Parliament (National Council). The 
National Council has 200 seats. Support is measured with four 
types (ordinal): (1) less than 50 votes (less than 25 percent)  
(11 votes); (2) between 50 and 66 votes (at least 25 percent) 
(10); (3) between 67 and 79 votes (at least one third) (3); and 
(4) at least 80 votes (at least 40 percent) (5). Data comes from 
 parliamentary proceedings and can be accessed on the official 
website of the Parliament: www.parlament.ch.
Party-internal division Score measuring how many parties are divided on the 
proposal; the four large government parties count twice, 
the three smaller parties count once (e.g., 2 points when 
SVP is divided, 1 point when the Green Party is divided). A 
party is considered divided when at least 5 cantonal sections 
(out of max. 26) differ from the national party and/or when 
the national party in its official voting recommendation has 
more than 1/3 deviating votes.
0 points (16 votes), 1 point (2), 2 points (7), 3 points (3),  
4 points (1), 5 points or more (0 votes).
Own calculations on the basis of statistics displayed on the 
website of Parliament, www.parlament.ch.
Poll results Three types (ordinal): (1) very clear (>10 percent) (21 votes); (2) 
clear (6–10 percent) (2); (3) close (<6 percent) (6). Measured as 
difference in percentage-points between yes/no share; ordinal 
instead of interval scale because there always is a certain number 
of “don’t know” or “undecided” answers.
Data come from publicly available reports from the 
 organization gfs.bern, which releases two polls during the “hot 
phase” of the campaign as a mandate for the public broadcaster 
SRG. In this article, we use the first poll, which is published 
around six weeks before the vote.
Closeness Closeness of the actual vote result (difference between yes/no 
votes in absolute percentage-points) (official statistics).
Minimum 0.1 percent (RTVG), maximum 42 percent 
(energy taxes), average 17 percent, median 15 percent, SD = 10.5.
Case study
Media sample:
1.3.2015 to 14.6.2015 (voting took place on 14.6.2015)
Twenty-six news outlets and programs from eight media organizations (an 
“F” indicates an outlet from French-speaking Switzerland)
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Media organization News outlet/program Media type
SRG (public broadcaster)
10vor10 TV news magazine
Tagesschau TV newscast
srf.ch (“News” section) News site of the public 
broadcaster
Weltwoche Verlags AG Weltwoche Weekly magazine
Basler Zeitung Medien Basler Zeitung Daily paper
Somedia Südostschweiz Daily paper
AZ Medien 
Aargauer Zeitung Daily paper
Schweiz am Sonntag Sunday paper
watson.ch Online pure player (free 
access)
NZZ Mediengruppe 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung Daily paper
Neue Luzerner Zeitung Daily paper
NZZ am Sonntag Sunday paper
Ringier 
Blick Daily tabloid
Blick am Abend Cost-free commuter paper
SonntagsBlick Sunday tabloid
Le Temps (F) Daily paper
L’Hebdo (F) Weekly magazine
Tamedia 
Tages-Anzeiger Daily paper
Berner Zeitung Daily paper
20 Minuten Cost-free commuter paper
SonntagsZeitung Sunday paper
24heures (F) Daily paper
Tribune de Genève (F) Daily paper
Le Matin (F) Daily tabloid
Le Matin Dimanche (F) Sunday tabloid
Independent variable: political and economic interests and their assumed 
effect on news coverage (5-point scale)
Media 
organization
Scale Explanation
Somedia Very 
positive
Relatively small private news organization in a small regional 
market with private broadcasting stations that would profit 
from the law financially; partnership with AZ Medien also to 
remain independent from the very large Zurich-based private 
media organizations.
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Media 
organization
Scale Explanation
AZ Medien Slightly 
positive
Medium-sized (at least for Swiss standards) media organization 
that sees the SRG as competitor mainly in the TV market, 
where AZ Medien is currently investing (newly launched TV 
channel TV24); at the same time, owner of two TV stations 
which would profit from the law financially; partnership 
with Somedia also to remain independent from the very large 
Zurich-based private media organizations.
SRG (public 
broadcaster)
Balanced Public broadcaster whose news programs by law are required 
to provide balanced news coverage, especially before votes and 
elections.
NZZ 
Mediengruppe
Slightly 
negative
Large media organization mainly operating in the Swiss market 
that sees the SRG as competitor in the online  sector; owner 
of two TV stations that would profit from the law financially; 
however, the online sector plays a much larger role in the orga-
nization’s business strategy compared to the broadcasting sector.
Ringier Very 
negative
Very large media organization, operating internationally and 
also offering tabloid media and entertainment services (e.g., 
ticketing), which sees the SRG as competitor in the online sec-
tor; no broadcasting stations supported financially by the state.
Tamedia Very 
negative
Very large media organization traded on the stock market and 
partly operating internationally that sees the SRG as competi-
tor in the online sector; no broadcasting stations.
Weltwoche 
Verlags AG
Very 
negative
Small media organization owned by Roger Köppel, who ran as 
a candidate for the SVP in 2015; close ties to SVP, which has 
been a vocal critic of public broadcasting.
Basler Zeitung Very 
negative
Small media organization partially owned by Christoph 
Blocher, vice president of the SVP; close ties to SVP, which has 
been a vocal critic of public broadcasting.
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